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"Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for
securing to the individual. . . the right 'to be let alone."'1
- Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, 1890
Associate Professor, Pace Law School. I would like to thank Mandy Tran and
Paul Babchik for their able research assistance, and Don Doernberg, James Fishman, and
Gayl Westerman for their insightful comments.
1.
Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890).
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"You have zero privacy anyway. Get over
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it."2

- Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealey, 1999
"Privacy" doctrine is currently one of the most high profile and
most vexing areas of the law. Its recent prominence is due at least in
part to the explosion of the Internet over the past decade 3 - a new
wave of "recent inventions and business methods" to rival
developments in the fields of photography and publishing in the time
of Warren and Brandeis. 4
Its vexatious nature is due to the
inconsistent comparisons that are sometimes drawn between the
various flavors of privacy in the public discourse.
When we speak of privacy in the Internet age, a distinction
needs to be drawn between what this article will refer to as
"traditional privacy," the law of whether and to what extent the state
can intrude in the private sphere of an individual 5, and "data
protection" or "information privacy," the regulation of the use of
personal information about individuals by non-state interests, such as
corporations. 6 Unfortunately, much of the public discourse on the
2.
See Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: 'Get Over It, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 26, 1999,
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0, 1283,17538,00.html.

3.

See, e.g., Patricia Buckley, Technology Consulting Forum: Electronic Commerce

in the Digital Economy, ACCOUNTING TODAY, July 26, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR

5561547.
4.

Warren & Brandeis, supranote 1, at 195.

5.
Examples of U.S. Federal legislation in this sphere include: the Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (regulating the collection, use, and transfer of personal
information by federal government agencies); the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12
U.S.C. § 3401 (2000) (limiting access to, and release of, customer financial records by
financial institutions); the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522 (2000) (prohibiting interception and disclosure of certain electronic, wire, and
oral communications); the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711
(2000) (same). Additionally, and importantly, these rights are protected by the First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the jurisprudence interpreting
them. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (finding First
Amendment protection for the distribution of anonymous leaftlets); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places" and
"what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area that is accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(invalidating a Connecticut law which prohibited the use of contraceptives as violative of
the constitutional "right of privacy"); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (finding that
an Alabama law which required the NAACP to produce a list of members' names and
addresses violated the First Amendment's "freedom of association"). But see, e.g., Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (finding that a New York law requiring the recording of
personal information in connection with prescription drugs was not an unconstitutional
exercise of state power).
6.
In the area of information privacy, the federal government has enacted, for
example: the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000); the Health Insurance
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subject of information privacy adopts a framework (and a concomitant
set of expectations) more suitable to traditional privacy: an inviolable
"right to be let alone" by the state. 7 As a number of commentators
have recognized, the modern incarnation of privacy, rather than
creating or reinforcing a sacrosanct right against the government,
actually creates a quasi-property right, where personal data is a
8
valuable commodity and access to it is negotiable.
Given the negotiable nature of information privacy, concepts
from economics in general, and game theory in particular, can be
useful in framing and explaining the ways in which actors in our
information privacy "system" actually conduct themselves vis-a-vis
personal information. Scott McNealey's opinion notwithstanding, 9
individuals in today's society do have some measure of privacy
protection. The potency of that protection ebbs and flows, depending
in part on the strategic choices made by a number of individual and
institutional actors, including the individual him- or herself.
This article briefly explores several scenarios in which
economic actors compete and cooperate in order to capture the value
in personal information. The focus then shifts to one particular
scenario: the ongoing interaction between the United States and the
European Union in attempting to construct data protection regimes
that serve the philosophies and citizens of each jurisdiction as well as
provide a strategic economic advantage. A game theoretic model is
presented to explain the course of dealings between the two actors,
including both unilateral and bilateral actions. Part I ends with an
exploration of opportunities for seizing competitive advantage, and for
fostering cooperative mutual advantage, through government action.
Several likely equilibrium states are posited, and a single ultimate
equilibrium is predicted.
Part I explores the literature on commodification and
negotiability of information in order to explain the contextual nature
of modern privacy and, further, introduces a number of the contexts

Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d) (2000); the Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000); and the Federal Financial
Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2000).
7.
See, e.g., Susan Llewelyn Leach, Privacy Lost With the Touch of a Keystroke?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 10, 2004, at 15; William Safire, Editorial, Medical
Intrusiveness Puts Privacy Rights on the Ropes, SAN MATEO COUNTY TIMES (Cal.), Mar. 11,

2004.
8.
See generally Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the
Anticommons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 899 (2003); Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner, Privacy in
Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 230 (2004); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in
PersonalInformation:An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996).
9.
See Sprenger, supra note 2.
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and actors among which information interactions take place. Then,
Part II focuses on a single context and a single pair of actors, the
This part describes their
United States and European Union.
divergent philosophies regarding data protection, the conflicting
legislative results that have flowed from those philosophies and the
attempts at "solving" the privacy conflict between these two actors via
negotiation.
Part III expresses the U.S.-E.U. privacy conflict as an extensive
form game, explains the history of interaction between the actors in
terms of such game and assesses the current negotiated "solution."
Finally, the article concludes with a consideration of the traditional
game theoretic underpinnings of the alternative outcomes and
assesses the likely stability of the equilibrium achieved.
I. NEGOTIABILITY AND CONTEXTUALITY OF PRIVACY

A. Commodification and Negotiability of Information
It is no secret that for many of the more developed participants
in the global economy (including the United States), knowledge goods
or information have supplanted manufactured goods as the main
engine of commerce. 10 Increasingly, the "commodity production of
knowledge" is the focus of advanced economies."
Even in the
manufacturing sectors, the processing of information about the goods
sold, and about those who purchase and use them, is as important as
the production and shipping of the goods themselves. 12 In what has
been called an "unprecedented proliferation of records and data," vast
10.
By some estimates, "[a]s much as three-quarters of the value of publicly traded
companies in America comes from intangible assets," leading Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan to deem America's economic output "predominantly conceptual." See
Kenneth Cukier, A Market for Ideas, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2005, at 67.
11.
See Paula Baron, Databases and the Commodification of Information, 49 J.
COPYR. SOCY U.S.A. 131 (2001).
12.
One example of this development is the increased research by manufacturers
into the use of Radio Frequency Identification ("RFID") technology to track the movement
of consumer goods. A product embedded with an RFID tag can transmit information about
when it leaves the factory, when it leaves the warehouse, when and where it is purchased
at retail, and, in combination with credit card information collected at the point of
purchase, by whom it is purchased at retail. Wal-Mart, the world's largest retailer, is in the
midst of an initiative that, by the end of 2006, will require all of its suppliers to use RFID
technology on products shipped to Wal-Mart and Sam's Club stores. See, e.g., Wal-Mart
Expands RFID Mandate, RFID JOURNAL,
Aug.
18,
2003,
available at
www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/539/1/1/; Laurie Sullivan, Wal-Mart Outlines RFID
Expansion Plans, INFO. WK., June 17, 2004, available at www.informationweek.com/
story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=2210051 1.
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fields of information about people and their activities populate large
and valuable databases. 13 In the modern information economy, even
navigating ostensibly non-commercial activities may involve perusing
databases for pertinent (and thus currently valuable) information. So,
not only do we contribute information to commercial databases every
time we buy a DVD online or use a frequent shopper card at the
market, we also make use of information stored in databases when we
search TiVo for the particulars of a favorite program or peruse a bus
Individuals are both producers and consumers of
schedule. 14
commodity information.
Although, as discussed above, personal information has become
a valuable commodity, its value is not necessarily inherent at its most
granular level. That is, a single piece of information (such as a last
name), or information about a single individual, or even information
about a single transaction involving an individual, may not be
interesting or valuable in isolation. Personal information is actually
the building block of a value-added asset, such as the sort of robust
database of customer profiles and preferences that allows Amazon.com
product
Wish Lists, and
"l-Click" ordering,
to provide
recommendations for its regular customers. 15 As with other valuable
assets and their inputs, private actors vie to monetize, trade, and
capture the value of information assets, including personal
information. As with bananas or steel, states may seek to benefit from
the trade in these valuable assets among private actors.

13.

Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for

Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001).

14.
See Baron, supra note 11, at 135 (citing Andrew Oram, The Sap and Syrup of
at
1,
with
Data Protection Laws,
Age:
Coping
Information
the
http://www.oreilly.com/-andyo/professional/collectionlaw.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2002));
Solove, supra note 13, at 1394.
15.
Amazon's 1-Click ordering allows the user to accelerate the purchase process by
storing credit card, billing address, and shipping address information in a customer profile.
1-Click,
http://www.amazon.congp/help/
Ordering
via
Amazon.com,
See
customer/display.html?nodeld=468480 (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). The order can be
processed with the click of a single on-screen button. Id. Wish Lists allow users to store
their shipping information along with a list of gifts that they would like to receive. See
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
Lists,
Wish
Amazon.com,
display.html?nodeId=897204 (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). The user's friends and family can
then presumably be directed to amazon.com, where they purchase a desired item, which is
Id.
Amazon provides its
shipped automatically, using the stored information.
"Recommendations" service by examining a user's past purchases and past ratings of items.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
Recommendations,
See
Amazon.com,
display.html?nodeId=13316081 (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). By comparing purchasing
behavior of other users whose purchase history overlaps with that of the first user, the
company recommends future items for consideration. Id.

6
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Given information's status as a commodity that can be built
into a valuable asset, characterizations of information privacy rights
as stark and inviolable, especially as against private actors, seem
incomplete at best. Actors in the marketplace for information assets,
including individual data subjects, negotiate, sometimes overtly and
sometimes tacitly, over access to personal information and its
attendant value.
Examples of these negotiations are legion.
Consumers routinely provide personal financial data to financial
services companies in exchange for credit, or at least a chance at
credit (no mortgage applicant seriously expects to receive access to
hundreds of thousands of dollars without providing reams of such
personal information). Customers of consumer products companies
provide their e-mail addresses in exchange for notification of a
merchant's sales and special offers. Registered users of e-commerce
sites such as Amazon.com register as a prerequisite to the company's
collecting the type of purchase history data that makes product
recommendations possible.
Even outside the consumer context,
individuals often provide personal data regarding previous
employment (including salary and performance data), in exchange for
an opportunity for new employment.
It is not the case that all uses of personal data smack of either
Big Brother or pernicious spam. Many uses are a result of some give
and take among participants in an information marketplace, who,
given the structure of the modern economy, might be seen as
inevitable dealers in information assets. 16 Without some dealing in
data, search costs would be higher for both merchants and consumers,
pricing would be less efficient, merchants would have less accurate
portraits of their customers, and there might even be higher incidence
of fraud. 17 Absent a negotiation over use of personal data, many online transactions could not occur at all.1 8 Overall, the marketplace in
personal information has been said to promote lower costs for
businesses and for society as a whole. 19

16.
See Jay Weiser, Measure of Damages for Violation of Property Rules: Breach of
Confidentiality, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 79 (2002).

17.

Id. at 80-81.

18.

On many e-commerce sites, a customer must reveal an e-mail address in order

to create a "paper" trail that allows for tracking of the order and notification of delivery
date. Although some sites provide for alternative payment information, the bulk of ecommerce transactions require use of a credit card.
19.
Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online
Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 86-87 (2002). See also id. at 106 (describing how
information collection and credit reporting facilitate pooling of loans, increasing creditor
liquidity and making more funds available to borrowers at lower cost).
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This notion of negotiability of privacy is not without its
problems. Imposing a negotiation framework on the privacy question
implies arms-length dealings where the parties have information
about, and are constrained by, for example, their respective costs,
target prices, and reserve prices. 20 However, while the "price" of an
individual's data may be readily apparent in some situations (in order
to receive a confirmation/receipt, a consumer must provide an e-mail
address), in many other situations it is far from obvious.
The
consumer may have no idea what price she should charge a merchant
for her data and thus may have a difficult time receiving true "market
value."

21

Further, the "negotiation" may often be forced on the
consumer. Think of the confirmation/receipt example given above.
What if the consumer does not care about receiving a confirmation and
does not want to hear from the merchant until the product is
delivered? Requiring an e-mail address to complete the transaction
forces the consumer into the information exchange. Finally, the
collection of data by companies may impose an externality on the
consumer: the company benefits from each collection, but does not
bear much in the way of cost. Merchants may tend to over-collect
personal information in many cases. 22 According to Daniel Solove, the
explosion of the use of targeted marketing rather than mass
marketing has led to data collection that "extends beyond information
about the consumer's views of the product to information about the
consumer herself, often including lifestyle details and even a full-scale
'23
psychological profile.
As a practical matter, the negotiability of privacy will turn on
issues of power and leverage. Solove uses Kafka's The Trial to
conceptualize the privacy problem:
Kafka depicts an indifferent bureaucracy, where individuals are pawns, not
knowing what is happening, having no say or ability to exercise meaningful control
over the process. This lack of control allows the trial to completely take over
Joseph K's life. The Trial captures the sense of helplessness, frustration, and
vulnerability one experiences when a large bureaucratic organization has control
over a vast dossier of details about one's life. 24

20.
The target price is the price at which each side would ideally like to conclude
the transaction. The seller's reserve price is the minimum price that she will accept, and
the buyer's reserve price is the maximum price that he will pay.
21.
See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 19, at 103.
22.
See id. at 102.
23.
Solove, supra note 13, at 1404.
24.
Id. at 1421.
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The frustration described by Solove explains the periodic public outcry
over a particular announced use or misuse of personal information, 25
as well as attempts by users of personal information to assuage that
frustration. An example of such an attempt is the corporate website
privacy policy. 26 Compounding the control issue is the question of who
deserves control, or, rather, who deserves to capture the value
associated with the information? Is the individual the sole architect of
the value of the information?
Or is the information formed in
relationships with others and given value through the consolidation
and categorization functions performed by advertisers and
marketers? 27 Paula Baron characterizes the debate over privacy and
the use of data as being "about the struggle for ownership in pure
information." 28 The struggle may also be characterized as one for the
25.
For example, in 2000, Internet advertising company DoubleClick stirred up
controversy, and attracted the scrutiny of the New York State Attorney General and the
Federal Trade Commission, when it announced plans to purchase a company called
Abacus. See Jeri Clausing, U.S. Investigating DoubleClick Over Privacy Concerns, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb.
16,
2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/02/
cyber/articles/17doubleclick.html; Crisis Control @ DoubleClick: FTC, Michigan & NY;
Stock
Takes
a
Hit,
PRIVACY
TIMES,
Feb.
18,
2000,
available at
http://www.privacytimes.com/NewWebstories/doubleclickpriv 223.htm. The acquisition
would have led to the mingling of non-personally-identifiable information long collected by
DoubleClick, and personally-identifiable information on many of the same individuals
residing in Abacus's databases. Clausing, supra. At the time, DoubleClick's privacy policy
promised users that the company would never merge information it collected in such a way
as to identify an individual. Id. Faced with possible action by the FTC and by various
states because of the inconsistency in its stated policy and its actions, DoubleClick
abandoned the plan to merge the data. See Letter from Joel Winston, Acting Associate
Director, Divison of Financial Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade
Commission, to Christine Varney, Esq., Hogan & Hartson, Attorney for Double-Click, Inc.
(Jan. 22, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/doubleclick.pdf.

In 1997,

several database companies, including LEXIS-NEXIS, came under fire for providing their
customers with database access to personal information about individuals, including Social
Security numbers. See Timothy Burn, Database Companies Agree to Police On-line
Information on Net Users, THE WASH. TIMES, June 11, 1997, at B12.
In response to
consumer complaints and the threat of legislative and regulatory action, LEXIS-NEXIS
pulled much of the most sensitive information from its P-Track service. Id. Also in 1997,
online portal Yahoo! discontinued its reverse telephone directory, which had allowed users
to access the name and address of an individual by entering that person's telephone
number.
See, e.g., Yahoo Pulls Phone Search, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 3, 1997,
http://news.com.com/Yahoo+pulls+phone+search/2100-1023_3-259291.html.
The company
cited e-mail complaints received from users as the reason for abandoning the service. Id.
26.
Some commentators have criticized such policies as a meaningless exercise. See
Solove, supra note 13 at 1451 (decrying privacy policies as "self-indulgent, making vague
promises such as the fact that a company will be careful with data; that it will respect
privacy; that privacy is its number one concern" and "phrased in a vague, self-aggrandizing
manner to make the corporation look good").
27.
See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1113
(2002).
28.
Baron, supra note 11, at 131.
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economic/marketing value represented by personal information. As
discussed further in Sections I.B and C, the struggle defined by Baron
is ongoing and contextual, and it is advanced by a potential host of
29
players beyond the individual and his bookseller.
B. Contextuality of Privacy
Because neither the negotiability of data privacy, nor the
marketplace in which individuals negotiate for the value of their
information, is inherently or entirely good or evil, examinations of
information privacy rights should not be made in isolation. Rather,
data privacy rights must be assessed in view of the circumstances
surrounding the data transaction. Solove emphasizes that privacy
should be viewed pragmatically, as a contextual and dynamic legal
phenomenon, rooted in the "concrete, historical, and factual
circumstances of life. 3 °
Privacy, and information privacy in
particular, "is not reducible to a single set of neutral conditions that
apply to all matters we deem private." 31 Rather than possessing a
singular, immutable "universal value" across all contexts, privacy
rights depend on their particular social context and the relative
32
importance of the information practices comprising that context.
If we are to deal with the privacy issues raised in the modern
information environment, we must accept the contextual nature of
privacy rights. If we are to navigate the contextual nature of privacy
rights, we must recognize the limitations of traditional paradigms for
analyzing those rights. Using the example of U.S. West, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission, Solove points out that part of
the difficulty experienced by courts adjudicating privacy cases is that
they are conceptualizing issues regarding the modern collection and
use of personal information by companies as if there is no difference
between that context and that of any other privacy problem. 33 In U.S.
West, the telecommunications carrier used First Amendment grounds
to challenge FCC rules implementing consumer privacy provisions of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 34 Using the Central Hudson

29.
See discussion infra Parts I.B-C.
30.
See Solove, supra note 27, at 1091.
31.
Id. at 1092.
32.
Id. at 1093.
33.
Id. at 1152 (citing 182 F. 3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999)).
34.
47 U.S.C. § 222, enacted as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
restricts use of, disclosure of, and access to Customer Proprietary Network Information,
stating that:
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intermediate scrutiny test, the Tenth Circuit held that the FCC's
restriction on commercial speech did not directly and materially
advance a substantial state interest. 35
In questioning the
substantiality of the state's interest in protecting privacy, the court
fell back on familiar and traditional ways of thinking about the harms
that flow from inadequate privacy protection, specifically, the
traditional tort paradigm. 36 The court was "fixated on a conception of
privacy that views its invasion as a discrete harm, . . . where the
individual is left with specific injuries that can be readily translated
into damages . . .",37 In an information environment where some uses
of personal information may cause harm, and some may be harmneutral (or even beneficial) to the individual, it is clear that the old
paradigms will not fit all modern contexts.
Even Judge Richard Posner's economic conception of privacy as
secrecy does not always neatly fit the economic reality of usage of
personal data in the Information Age. 38 Although one way of looking
at privacy is as the right to secrecy, or the right to "conceal
discreditable facts,"' 39 facts do not have to be discreditable for the
individual to have an economic interest in concealing them. Selective
disclosure of facts about oneself may be beneficial to the individual
even if the facts are neutral. For example, my e-mail address or snail
mail address are neutral pieces of information without regard to my
virtue, trustworthiness, or sense of honor. Nevertheless, I might be
selective about revealing this information to an interested party

[e]xcept as required by law or with the approval of the customer, a
telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer proprietary
network information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service
shall only use, disclose, or permit access to individually identifiable customer
proprietary network information in its provision of (A) the telecommunications
service from which such information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or
used in, the provision of such telecommunications service, including the
publishing of directories.
47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2000). The statute provides exceptions for, inter alia, billing, fraud
prevention, and inbound telemarketing and administrative services.
See id. § 222 (d).
The challenged FCC rules required an "opt-in" approach to customer consent, in which a
customer's prior express approval would have to be obtained before her information could
be used for marketing purposes. See U.S. West, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 182 F. 3d
1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999).
35.
U.S. West, Inc., 182 F. 3d at 1240.
36.
See id. at 1235 (characterizing a "substantial" state interest in privacy as one
where the state protects against infliction of "specific and significant harm on individuals,
such as undue embarrassment or ridicule, intimidation or harassment, or misappropriation
of sensitive personal information for the purposes of assuming another's identity").
37.
Solove, supra note 27, at 1153.
38.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40 (6th ed. 2003).
39.
Id; see also Solove, supra note 27, at 1106.
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unless I gain some advantage from the revelation. Will I receive
discount coupons for giving my e-mail address to Old Navy? Will I
receive advance notice of sales in exchange for allowing Macy's to mail
If I cease to be interested in Amazon.com's book
me catalogs?
recommendations, can I remove my information from their active
database at some future date? The facts and situations within which
an actor within the information system chooses disclosure are varied
and mutable. A mere pouring of new wine into old bottles will not
suffice, and updated paradigms of how multiple actors (including
individuals, companies, agents, administrative bodies, states, and
supra-national organizations) actually treat personal information
under various circumstances must be part of any privacy framework.
It is necessary to bear in mind always the "context and contingency" of
40
uses of personal information.
C. Key Privacy Contexts, Characters,and Contours of Competition
What then are the contexts with which we should be concerned
in understanding how the value of information is apportioned in the
modern privacy landscape? We may define these contexts in terms of
a cast of characters vying to capture the value of the information, and
also in terms of the structure of their struggle over that value. Often,
the characters are paired in a binary struggle. For our purposes, we
will consider the following characters, or types of actors within the
privacy system: Individuals, Legitimate Businesses, Illegitimate
Businesses, Domestic Governments and Foreign Governments.
Individuals are just that, individuals who are either the subjects of the
personal data in question, or interested in using the personal data of
others. Legitimate Businesses are those businesses with which an
Individual may have a relationship, or with whom an Individual
would not categorically reject having a relationship in the future.
Illegitimate Businesses are those who would like to use an
Individual's data, but whom the Individual would reject as
inappropriately risky users of that data. A Domestic Government is
the government of the state where an Individual or Business is
domiciled, and a Foreign Government is the government of any other
state.
The first pairing of interest in the competition over the value of
personal information is that of the Individual vs. the Domestic
Government. This is the first type of privacy scenario many people
think about when they think about privacy, especially the
40.

Solove, supra note 27, at 1127.
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"traditional" privacy mentioned earlier in this article. 41 Although this
pairing is typically discussed in terms of civil liberties, individual
rights, or constitutional rights, 42 it may also be viewed through an
economic lens. In many situations in which a government may seek
information about an individual, the information has value, and each
actor may be characterized as trying to capture or retain the value of
that information. Think of the example of police surveillance of a
criminal organization. The identity and movement patterns of the
boss of the organization would be of great value to the state in seeking
to prosecute him as the head of a criminal enterprise and to dismantle
his gang. Information about meetings and conversations with known
perpetrators of crimes would similarly be valuable to the state and its
law-abiding citizenry. The boss and the members of his organization,
however, derive great value from limiting the disclosure of such
information. If the information can be kept from the police, the boss
can continue to lend his acumen to the enterprise, and the
organization can continue to reap illegal profits. Each side will take
steps to secure the value of the information for its own "account,"
including use of video and audio surveillance, informants, and
undercover operatives on one side, and use of code words and
intermediaries on the other.
A second pairing of competitors for the value in personal
information involves an Individual versus a Legitimate Business.
This is the classic case of a company coming into possession of a
person's information legitimately and seeking to make a marketing
use of such information. The information may be valuable because it
allows the marketer to understand the customer better, and leads to
further sales to a particular Individual. An example of this type of
value is the value of collecting and keeping purchase history
information about a customer in order to make purchase
recommendations to that same customer in the future. The Business
also may derive value from the information by combining it with
information about other customers. This allows the Business to
recognize macro trends in the purchasing behavior of its entire
customer base or of relevant segments. The Individual attempts to
capture or reserve the value of her personal information by
withholding certain information from the Business or by extracting

41.
42.

See introduction supra pp. 2-3.
Examples of this view are: the right of the Individual not to have his telephone

conversations monitored and/or recorded, the right not to be compelled by the state to
reveal political or interest group affiliation, and the right to make certain personal
decisions, such as the decision to use contraception, without state scrutiny or interference.
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some benefit in exchange for the information.
In the latter
circumstance, even though the Individual extracts a benefit, it is often
the Business that sets the terms of the exchange and makes the offer.
For example, a Business may give a discount (or ongoing discounts) in
exchange for an application for a store credit card or membership
card. The Individual would also like to retain the value in her
information by compelling the Business to offer an additional benefit
for each use, for each new use, or for each request for additional
information. For example, the Individual would like to receive a
discount for signing up for a credit card, but there is no necessity for
an e-mail address to be included in the information requested on the
application.
In exchange for providing an e-mail address, the
Individual may want some ongoing benefit, such as periodic "members
only" sales or previews.
Of more concern to the Individual is her competition with
Illegitimate Businesses for the value in her personal information. For
our purposes, an Illegitimate Business is one that may have acquired
the personal information without the knowledge of the Individual and
that the Individual would likely reject as a holder or user of her
information. The classic case of this pairing is unsolicited commercial
e-mail, or spam. The Illegitimate Business seeks to capture the value
of the information (often, in the spam context, e-mail addresses) by
adding it to bulk e-mail mailing lists. With very large bulk e-mail
lists, the cost of sending each e-mail message is infinitesimal. 43 As the
size of a bulk e-mail list grows, the probability of the Illegitimate
Business receiving a positive response, and a potential sale, increases.
Even though response rates to bulk marketing (including bulk mail
and bulk e-mail) are extremely low, 44 expansion of the mailing list
allows the Illegitimate Business to apply its low response percentage
to a larger base. Meanwhile, the probability that the Individual wants
to actually receive a solicitation from an Illegitimate Business is also
extremely low. 45 It is in the Individual's interest not to have her
information revealed to the Illegitimate Business at all, and she
"wins" the competition and retains the value of her information when
the information remains unknown to the Illegitimate Business. She

43.
See Michael A. Fisher, The Right to Spam? Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 363, 364 (2000).
44.
By some estimates, bulk mail response rates are as low as 0.6%, and bulk email response rates are similarly less than 1%. See Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing
Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 90-91 (2003).

45.
See Fisher, supra note 43, at 365 (describing public complaints regarding spam
received by the Federal Trade Commission and Securities Exchange Commission, and
public calls for limits on electronic junk mail).
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may also score a limited win when she has the ability to spot and
ignore, or filter out, e-mail messages from the Illegitimate Business,
minimizing the costs imposed upon her and her e-mail service
provider by the Illegitimate Business. 46 In the United States, the
Domestic Government has entered this competition on the side of the
Individual, passing the CAN-SPAM Act in 2003, and requiring, among
other things, that advertising e-mails be labeled as such, that header
information and subject lines not be misleading or deceptive, and that
recipients be given the choice to opt out of receiving future e-mail
messages from the sender. 47 While measures such as CAN-SPAM are
applicable to those Illegitimate Businesses that are domiciled
domestically, they provide no aid to the Individual struggling against
a foreign Illegitimate Business that is beyond the jurisdiction of the
48
Domestic Government.
The Individual does not struggle only against organizations or
companies over the value of her information. Other Individuals seek
to capture the value of the personal data as well. Identity theft is an
example of this privacy context. 49 'The Identity Thief who is able to
learn the right type of personal information about the data subject
(name, address, telephone, Social Security number, credit card
account numbers, etc.) can derive benefits from posing as the Data
Subject. The Identity Thief can present himself as a creditworthy
person with a stable well-paying job, and therefore qualify for a large
one-time purchase, a consumer credit account, or even a loan. Of
course, because the Thief is merely posing as a creditworthy
individual, he does not care about maintaining that creditworthiness.
He has incentives to default on whatever obligations he "assumes"
while wearing his new identity. Such inattention to maintaining the
status of the Data Subject ultimately leads to losses for the Data
Subject. 50 The Data Subject's main options for retaining the value of
46.
The costs of spai are particularly irksome to Individuals, because such costs
are almost completely externalized by the sender. See Ayres & Funk, supra note 44, at

136. The marginal cost to the Illegitimate Business will tend toward zero. Id.
47.
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CANSPAM) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2719 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp.
III 2003)).
48.
Generally, only bulk e-mail senders that are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission or certain other federal regulators such as the Securities
Exchange Commission or Federal Communications Commission will have the CAN-SPAM
Act enforced against them. See 15 U.S.C. § 7706(b) (Supp. III 2003).
49.
Identity theft is "the illegal use of someone else's personal information ... in
order to obtain money or credit." See Meriam Webster Online Dictionary, Identity Theft,
http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/identity%20theft (last visited Nov. 4, 2006).
50.
The Federal Trade Commission has reported that nearly 10 million Americans
were victims of identity theft in 2003, resulting in losses of approximately $5 billion. Do
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her information are being judicious about sharing of the information
with others and policing her credit reports for evidence that her
information has been misappropriated.
Finally, the competition over the value in an Individual's
information (or, more accurately, the information of many
Individuals), may be played out between two States. Commodification
of personal data allows such data to be treated like other commodities
in some ways. Information may become an object of the trade strategy
and goals of a state or multi-state trade alliance. Protection of the
privacy rights of its citizens, or preservation of the value of that
information for domestic users, may become part of a government's
foreign policy. As such, the potential advantage inherent in valuable
information may cause a State to enact new laws, vigorously enforce
existing ones, seek to influence the lawmaking of its trading partners,
reward its friends, and punish its rivals.5 1 As this article will
establish in Section II, information policy can be used to reinforce the
cohesion of a trade alliance.5 2 Section II explores the relationship
between two governments, the supranational government of the
European Union and the national government of the United States,
with regard to information privacy policy.5 3 As with the other contexts
previously discussed in this Section, the essence of the relationship is
a contextual and ongoing negotiation and competition over the value
54
in the personal information of Individuals.

You Know Where Your Identity Is? Personal Data Theft Eludes Easy Remedies,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON,
Apr.
20,
2005,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
index.cfm?fa=printArticle&ID=1176.
The companies that did business with identity
thieves (by selling them goods and services, and/or extending them credit), lost upwards of
$47.6 billion on such transactions. Id.
51.
For example, the European Union is viewed by many as heavily impacting
commercial regulation beyond its borders, particularly in the areas of consumer protection,
software, and technology, telecommunications, and data privacy. See, e.g., Brandon
Mitchener, StandardBearers:Increasingly,Rules of Global Economy Are Set in Brussels --To Farmers and Manufacturers, Satisfying EU Regulators Becomes a Crucial Concern --From Corn to SUV 'Bull Bars, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2002, at Al.
52.
See discussion infra Part II.
53.
Id.
54.
See discussion supra Part I.
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II. THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE STATE VS.
STATE CONTEXT

A. Divergent Philosophies
The United States and the nations of the European Union have
traditionally held starkly different positions on data privacy, including
the appropriateness of government regulation of the collection and use
of personal information by the private sector. 55 The essence of these
differences can be understood by appreciating how each jurisdiction
might answer two basic questions. First, to what extent is government
regulation perceived as an effective and desirable way to provide for
the needs of individuals? Second, to what extent is data privacy (as
against private actors) considered a fundamental right of individuals?
The contrasting philosophies of the two jurisdictions 56 set the stage for
the dissimilar privacy approaches and outcomes that occur in practice.
Data protection in the European Union countries can be
characterized as adhering to a philosophy of a high degree of
57
government involvement in the protection of a fundamental right.
Stephen Kobrin has described the European approach to privacy as
"put[ting] the burden of protection on society rather than the
individual."58 Others have noted that
[g]overnment on the European continent is perceived ... more as the protector of
individual needs, rather than an entity who interferes with those needs. Europe is
more comfortable with a socialist approach where government protects an
individual's liberties, basic needs such as food and shelter, and continuing rights to
59
employment.

Still others have gone as far as to call the European privacy model a
"command and control model with precise rules governing the
handling of personal information. '60
James Whitman mines the
55.

See infra text accompanying notes 58 & 61.

56.

Id.

57.
See Alexander Zinser, The Safe Harbor Solution: Is It An Effective Mechanism
For InternationalData Transfers Between The United States And The European Union?, 1
OKLA. J. L. & TECH 11 (2004), http://www.okjolt.org/articles/2004okjoltrevl 1.cfm.
58.
Stephen J. Kobrin, Safe Harbours are Hard to Find: The Trans-Atlantic Data
Privacy Dispute, TerritorialJurisdiction and Global Governance, 30 REV. INVL STUD. 111,
116 (2004) (contrasting the European approach with the American approach to privacy,
which emphasizes individual ownership and control over, and alienability of, personal
information).
59.
Carl Felsenfeld, Unnecessary Privacy, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 365, 370
(2002).
60.
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Harmonizing Cybertort Law For
Europe and America, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 13, 60 (2005).
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European historical and cultural context to declare that European
privacy is ultimately most concerned with human dignity, and thus
"avidly" protects a wide range of types of privacy in many areas of dayto-day life. 61 The E.U. Data Protection Directive made clear the
approach expected of its Member States when it declared that "dataprocessing systems are designed to serve man" and must "respect
62
their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy."
By contrast, privacy law in the United States is generally
63
concerned with upholding privacy rights against the government.
"At its conceptual core, the American right to privacy still takes much
the form that it took in the eighteenth century: It is the right to
64
freedom from intrusions by the state, especially in one's own home."
Regarding private actors, the information privacy philosophy of the
United States, at least for most of the nation's history, is most often
characterized as a market-based or largely laissez-faire type of
approach. 6 5 In this view, privacy rights are property-like; they are
alienable, tradable, and waivable. 66 Such an approach is consistent
with Whitman's argument that American notions of privacy are
grounded in liberty, rather than dignity. 67 The most important thing
is to protect the individual from state intrusion into the choices she

61.
See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1156-58 (2004) (describing European protection in the areas of
"consumer data, credit reporting, workplace privacy, discovery in civil litigation, the
dissemination of nude images on the Internet, [and] shielding criminal offenders from
public exposure" (internal citations omitted), and further describing underpinnings of
European privacy culture in the European Convention on Human Rights).
62.
Council Directive 95/46, pmbl. 2, The Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281)
31 (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 95/46].
63.
Kobrin, supra note 58, at 115; see also Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher
Can Teach the Patient:Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1228 (2000) (citing examples from traditional American definitions
of privacy, such as freedom from government searches, and freedom from government
interference in individual decision-making).
64.
Whitman, supra note 61, at 1161 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, THE UNWANTED GAZE:
THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 5 (2000)).

65.
See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Seizing the Initiative on Privacy: Online Industry Presses
its Case for Self-Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1999, at C1 (describing concerns raised by
the Federal Trade Commission regarding efficacy of the traditional U.S. self-regulatory
model of data protection).
66.
See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,50 STAN.
L. REV. 1193, at 1246-49 (1998); Murphy, supra note 8, at 2402.
67.
Whitman, supra note 61, at 1162-64. Whitman describes American anxieties
about privacy as being concerned with "maintaining a kind of private sovereignty within
our own walls." Id. at 1162. In his conception of comparative U.S.-E.U. privacy, "American
privacy law is a body caught in the gravitational orbit of liberty values, while European
law is caught in the orbit of dignity." Id. at 1163.
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makes regarding her personal information. Self-regulation by private
users of personal information is the American ethos, with government
stepping in to fill gaps reactively, and narrowly. 68 Preserving both
individual autonomy and commercial flexibility has traditionally been
paramount, and industry has historically been trusted to police itself,
particularly where such self-policing would support continued growth
and development of the Internet. 69 The Clinton Administration's
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, one of the early and few
comprehensive federal government statements on Internet privacy
issues, enumerated encouragement of self-regulation and government
restraint as two of its core principles. 70
B. Conflicting Legislative Results
Not surprisingly, the legislative regimes of the two
jurisdictions in question evolved in markedly different directions. 71
The laws of the United States regarding data protection have
justifiably been called a "legal patchwork," 72 "fragmented,"73 a
"discordant morass," 74 "reactive,"75
"a crazy quilt of piecemeal
statutes," 76 "sporadic," 77 and "inchoate."78 Although Congress has
considered a number of bills in this area, 79 there is to date no
68.

See Zinsner, supra note 57,

3 (characterizing U.S. policymaking as "reactive,"

and favoring targeted solutions to privacy problems).
69.
See, e.g., Lohr, supra note 65. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1999), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/privacy99.pdf; Chris J. Hoofnagle, Privacy Self Regulation: A
Decade of Disappointment (Electronic Privacy Information Center, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 4,
2005, http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.html.
70.
See Felsenfeld, supra note 59, at 365-66; A Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce, The White House (July 1, 1997), http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/
framewrk.htm.
71.
Compare text accompanying notes 72-78 with text accompanying notes 92-97.
72.
See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 63, at 1229.
73.
See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The
Prospects and Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual
Recognition and Safe HarborAgreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 61 (2002).
74.
Stephen J. Davidson & Daniel M. Bryant, The Right of Privacy: International
Discord and the Interface with Intellectual Property Law, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW.
Nov. 2001, at 1, 1.
75.
See Kobrin, supra note 58, at 117; Zinsner, supra note 57, 3 (quoting William
J. Long & Marc Peng Quek, Personal Privacy Protection in an Age of Globalization:The
US-EU Safe Harbor Compromise, 9 J.EUR. PUB. POLY 325, 332 (2002)).
76.
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 60, at 39.
77.
Kobrin, supra note 58, at 117.
78.
Id.
79.
Recent attempts have included the proposed Personal Data Privacy and
Protection Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005); the proposed Online Privacy
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comprehensive federal information privacy statute. Instead, there are
sector specific laws designed to address specific types and uses of
personal information.8 0 As a matter of national statutory law, the
8
United States protects, for example, financial information, '
8 3
82
information,
health-related
children,
about
information
8 4
information,8 5
rental
video
reports,
in
credit
information contained
and certain information regarding cable television subscribers86
Unless a piece of personal information fits within one of the above
types, it is likely not covered by any specific federal statute. Some
protection has been provided by the role played by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") in protecting against unfair trade practices. The
FTC is authorized to investigate "the organization, business, conduct,
practices, and management of any person, partnership, or corporation
engaged in or whose business affects commerce
."87
More
specifically, the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to pursue complaints of
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,"
including deceptive practices relating to the collection and use of
personal data.8 8 Additionally, protection against certain specific and
intrusive uses has been provided by recent federal action in the areas
of SPAM8 9 and unwanted telemarketing calls. 90
By and large,
however, most of the immense amount of data collected by private
interests in the United States slips through the statutory cracks. 9 1

Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 84, 109th Cong. (2005); and the proposed Consumer Privacy
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1263, 109th Cong. (2005).
80.
See sources cited infra notes 81-86.
81.
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2000).
82.
See Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(2000).
83.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
84.
See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
85.
See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
86.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222(c) (2000).
87.
15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2000). Banks, savings & loan institutions, credit unions, and
common carriers are excepted from this authority. Id.
88.
Id. § 45(a)(1).
89.
See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CANSPAM) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2719 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp.
III 2003)).
90.
FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule (the Federal "Do-Not-Call" Registry), 16 CFR §
310.1-9 (2006).
91.
Some states, notably California, have moved to fill the gaps left by federal
statutes, but this Article is concerned with statutory action at the national level. See
Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575-79 (Deering
2003).
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Meanwhile, information privacy protection in the European
92
Union has long been the subject of comprehensive legislative action.
Beginning in the 1970's, several countries developed national laws
regulating the processing of data about individuals, including
collection, use, and storage. 93 These laws, although emanating from a
shared understanding of individual rights, did not provide a uniform
level of protection. 94 In an effort to harmonize the differences among
national laws and facilitate the free flow of data across intra-Union
borders, the then-fifteen Member States of the E.U. put into effect
Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data
("E.U. Directive"). 95
The E.U. Directive prescribes specific
requirements for the handling (or "processing") of personal data,
defined as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person." 96 An "identifiable person" (the "data subject" of the
personal data) is "one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic,
97
cultural or social identity."
"Processing" of personal data is defined broadly to mean "any
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording,
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available,
alignment or combination,
blocking,
erasure or
destruction." 9 The E.U. Directive covers the processing activities of
both "data controllers" (those who determine the purposes of, and
means for, processing),99 and "data processors" (those who actually
process the data on behalf of a controller). 100 The Member States of
the European Union are required to adopt national laws consistent

92.
See infra notes 93-96.
93.
See European Commission, Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/law/implementationen.htm (last visited Nov.
4, 2006) (listing legislation in various countries, including France's 1978 Act on Data
Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties, and Ireland's Data Protection Act 1988).
94.
See generally statutes listed in id. that preceded Council Directive 95/46/EC.
95.
See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 62.
96.
Id. art. 2(a).
97.
Id.
98.
Id. art. 2(b).
99.
Id. art. 2(d).
100.
Id. art. 2(e).
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with the E.U. Directive. 10 1 Those national laws are required to apply
where the processing activities of a data controller take place in the
territory of a Member State, where a Member State's national law
applies by virtue of international public law, or where a data
controller makes use of equipment situated within the territory of a
10 2
Member State.
The E.U. Directive requires that the laws enacted by Member
States provide for adherence to certain principles in the processing of
personal data. 10 3 Personal data must be processed fairly and in a
manner consistent with specified, explicit and legitimate purposes,
maintained accurately, updated periodically, erased or rectified in a
timely manner, and kept anonymously when identification of data
subjects is no longer necessary. 10 4 Member States must provide in
their national laws that personal data may only be processed where:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data
subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to
entering into a contract; or
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the
controller is subject; or
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject; or
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the
public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a
third party to whom the data are disclosed; or
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued
by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed,
except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights
and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under Article 1(1).105

Certain categories of data receive an even higher level of
protection under the E.U. Directive. 10 6 Data about race, ethnicity,
political or religious affiliation, health, sex life, or union membership
may not be processed, subject to an explicit consent exception, and
10 7
certain other narrow exceptions.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. art. 4(1).
Id.
See id. art. 6.
Id.
Id. art. 7.
See id art. 8.
Id.

22

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 9: 1:1

Data controllers must give notice to data subjects of, among
other things, their own status as data controllers, the purpose of the
processing, the identities of the recipients of the data, and the fact
that the data subject has a right of access and correction.1 0 8 The
access right, provided by Article 12 of the E.U. Directive, requires
Member States to guarantee that data subjects may obtain from the
data controller information regarding the processing of the data
subject's information, including the categories of data being processed,
the purpose of the processing, the source of the data, and the logic by
which the data is being processed. 10 9 Article 12 also provides that
data may be rectified, erased, or blocked if its processing does not
comply with the provisions of the E.U. Directive.1 1 0 Article 14 grants
further objection rights to the data subject, allowing prohibition of use
of data where the data subject articulates "compelling legitimate
grounds," and enabling the data subject to object to the use of his
personal data for direct marketing purposes.11 1 Data subjects also
have the right not to be subject to decisions about them that are
arrived at via automated processing rather than human decisionmaking.112
Data controllers face additional requirements and constraints
under the E.U. Directive. Data security measures must provide (or
require from its data processors) an "appropriate" level of protection
against destruction, loss, unauthorized alteration, or unauthorized
disclosure.1 13 The appropriateness of security measures is to be
determined with reference to the state of the art regarding data
security.11 4 Any processing involving retention of a data processor
must be governed by contract wherein the processor agrees to act only
on instructions from the controller, and also assumes the data security
responsibilities that bind the controller."15
Generally, the data
controller must also notify the data protection authority ("DPA") of the
relevant Member State before carrying out a data processing
operation that is automatic in nature, either in whole or in part.1 16 All
Member States of the union were required by the E.U. Directive to

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. art. 17(1).
Id.
Id. art. 17(3).
Id. art. 18(1).

10-11.
12(a).
12(c)
14.
15.
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enact implementing legislation bringing their national laws into
harmony with the Directive's requirements by October 1998.117
C. The Tie That Binds
The E.U. Directive certainly establishes a comprehensive
regime, one that might even seem stifling to an individual or company
used to a more American information privacy ethos. But why exactly
did the European Union's subjecting itself to a hyper-stringent set of
data privacy practices gore America's ox? The answer is twofold.
First, the value of trade between the United States and the European
Union is enormous. In 2003, the total value of trade with the fifteen
nations that made up the European Union when the E.U. Directive
was adopted was over $400 billion. 118 By one estimate, inclusion of
transactions between affiliates in the trade calculation would bring
the value of U.S.-E.U. trade to $1.7 trillion. 119 As the European Union
continues to expand, the value of transactions between the two
jurisdictions can be expected to continue to grow as well. 120 Much of
the commercial traffic between the United States and the European
Union is accompanied by, or consists of, streams of data. Sales of
goods (for example, the purchase of a pair of customized athletic shoes
by a French teenager from an American multinational 21 ) may involve
the collection of information from and/or about a customer. Online

117.
Id. art. 32. As of this writing, all Member States had enacted legislation
seeking to comply with the Directive. See Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation-en.htm (last visited Oct.
10, 2006).
118.
See U.S. Census Bureau, Trade with European
Union:
2003,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-tradebalance/cOOll.html#2003 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
Total trade for the first five months of 2005 with the 25 nations of the recently expanded
Union was $202 billion. See U.S. Census Bureau, Trade with European Union: 2005,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0003.html#2005 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
119.
See Shaffer, supra note 73, at 30 (citing TransatlanticGovernance in Historical
and Theoretical Perspective, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3,
4 (Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2001)).
120.
The European Union currently consists of 25 Member States: Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See European
Union Member States, http://europa.eu/abd/governments/indexen.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2006).
An additional five nations (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey) are currently candidate countries. Id.
121.
See, for example, NikeID.com, Nike's online customization store,
http://nikeid.nike.com/nikeid/index.jhtml?ref--www.nike.com#home (last visited Oct. 10,
2006).

24

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 9: 1:1

purchases of services or technology goods (such as software) similarly
involve exchanges of information.
Secondly, the E.U. Directive creates the possibility that the
122
streams of information alluded to above might come to a halt.
Article 25 requires the Member States to allow transfers of personal
data to countries outside of the European Union "only if ... the third
' 123
country in question ensures an adequate level of protection."
"Adequacy" is to be assessed based upon a number of factors,
including:
the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing
operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the

rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and
the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that
country. 124

A finding of inadequacy requires a Member State to take steps
to prevent transfers to a given third country. 125 A third country may
enter into negotiations with the European Commission in order to
rectify the situation, and may achieve adequacy via its domestic law or
its international commitments. 126 Article 26 provides a number of
derogations from, or exceptions to, Article 25's prohibition on transfers
to countries with inadequate privacy protection. 12 7 Among these are
unambiguous consent of the data subject, necessity of the transfer for
performance or completion of a contract, protection of the vital
interests of the data subject, and necessity to the public interest. 128
Additionally, a data controller may make certain guarantees
regarding protection of privacy rights in order to gain approval from a
Member State's DPA for a particular data transfer or set of
29
transfers. 1
As a practical matter, the derogations do not provide much
relief for a company located in an "inadequate" country that wishes to
import data from a European Union Member State.
Obtaining
unambiguous consent from every data subject that is part of a high
volume of online transactions can be nearly impossible. 130
The

122.
See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 62, art. 25(1).
123.
Id.
124.
Id. art. 25(2).
125.
Id. art. 25(4).
126.
Id. art. 25(5)-(6).
127.
Id. art. 26(1).
128.
Id.
129.
Id. art. 26(2).
130.
See Rose Barcelo, Seeking Suitable Options for Importing Data from the
European Union, 36 INT'L LAW. 985, 995 (2002).
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European Commission's interpretation of what constitutes a
"necessary" transfer is extremely narrow and renders the necessitybased derogations of little use to most data controllers. 31 The
practical limitations of Article 26 and the stark prohibitions of Article
25 have resonance with U.S.-based companies because the United
States was not at the time of the E.U. Directive's adoption, nor is it
132
currently, deemed to provide adequate protection to personal data.
Without some sort of accommodation on either side, American
multinationals faced the prospect of not being able to move crucial
information (including transactional data, marketing profiles, and
employee records) from the European countries where they were
collected to the United States divisions in which their value would be
realized.
D. A Negotiated Solution
The prospect of a catastrophic cessation of data flows from
Europe prompted the United States Department of Commerce to enter
into bilateral negotiations with the European Commission, with the
goal of finding a data protection solution that would pass muster as
"adequate" by European Union standards without excessively
burdening U.S.-based multinationals. 133 The result was Safe Harbor,
a self-certification program that allows participating U.S. firms to be
deemed adequate protectors of personal data, as far as the Member
States of the European Union are concerned. Data transfers from all
Member States to Safe Harbor companies are allowed to continue
without prior approval from the DPAs of the Member States. 3 4

131.
132.

See id. at 996.
To date, the following non-Member States have been declared by the European

Commission to provide adequate protection to personal data, for purposes of Article 25:
Switzerland (Commission Decision 2000/518, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 1); Canada (Commission
Decision 2002/2, 2001 O.J. (L 2) 13); Argentina (Commission Decision 2003/490, 2003 O.J.
(L 168)); Guernsey (Commission Decision, 2003/821, 2003 O.J. (L 308) 27); and the Isle of
Man (Commission Decision, 2004/411, 2004 O.J. (L 151) 1). See Commission Decisions on
the
Adequacy
of the
Protection of Personal
Data
in
Third
Countries,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice-home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/indexen.htm
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2006).
133.
See Kobrin, supra note 58, at 113.
134.
See
U.S.
Department
of
Commerce,
Safe
Harbor
Overview,
http://export.gov/safeharbor/shoverview.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2006); see also
Commission Decision Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC on the Adequacy of Safe Harbor
Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/DecisionSECGEN-EN.htm (last visited Nov.
4, 2006) (assuring that additional guarantees are not necessary for Safe Harbor
companies).
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Participating companies join Safe Harbor by annually certifying to the
Department of Commerce that they are in compliance with seven Safe
Harbor Principles. 135 They must also state in their published privacy
statements that they adhere to the principles. 136 A firm may achieve
the promised adherence by "(1) join[ing] a self-regulatory privacy
program that adheres to the safe harbor's requirements; or (2)
develop[ing] its own self regulatory privacy policy that conforms to the
safe harbor." 137 The Department of Commerce maintains a list of
138
companies that have self-certified.
The seven Safe Harbor Principles are: Notice, Choice, Onward
Transfer, Access, Security, Data Integrity, and Enforcement. 139 In
essence, the principles require that a firm notify data subjects about
the purpose for the collection and use of their information and that the
data subject be able to choose whether the data will be used for any
other purpose or disclosed to a third party. In order to disclose data to
a third party (Onward Transfer), the firm must comply with the
Notice and Choice principles. 140 Data subjects must have access to
their data and be reasonably able to correct, amend, or delete their
information.141 Firms must take reasonable steps to provide effective
data security and data integrity, and they must provide procedures
and mechanisms for handling data subjects' complaints and disputes
42
regarding the handling of their data.1
Participation in Safe Harbor is currently open to organizations
that are subject to the regulatory authority of the FTC or the United
States Department of Transportation. 43 Both agencies have indicated
via letters to the European Commission that they will take action
against Safe Harbor companies who do not meet their obligations
under the program. 144 Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, along with the
terms of the Safe Harbor program, participants who fail to provide
adequate protection may be subject to an FTC action for engaging in

135.
See Shaffer, supra note 73, at 62.
136.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 134.
137.
Id.
138.
The Department of Commerce Safe Harbor list may be found at
http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list.
139.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 134.
140.
Id.
141.
See id.
142.
For a more detailed treatment of the Safe Harbor Principles, see id.
143.
Id. This means that companies in certain industries, including much of the
financial services sector, is unable to participate in Safe Harbor, and thus have not
resolved their issues regarding Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive.
144.
See id.
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"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 14 5 A
delinquent Safe Harbor firm may find itself subject to administrative
orders, penalties of up to $12,000 per day, and removal from the Safe

Harbor list.146
Safe Harbor has received mixed reviews.
To some, it
represents a successful compromise that may contribute to "a gradual
convergence in data privacy practices." 147 To others, Safe Harbor
means that both Americans and Europeans find themselves "subject to
a privacy regime that is not of their making and certainly does not
reflect their common interests." 148 Participation levels have not been
overwhelming. As of September 2006, approximately 1014 companies
were current in their certification status with the Safe Harbor
program. 149
This represents a fairly small percentage of U.S.
companies in total. Of the current Safe Harbor companies, only 60 are
members of the Fortune 500.150 Presumably, companies of that size
and global reach were the types of companies for whom Safe Harbor
was designed in the first place. The European Commission has voiced
disappointment in the number of registered Safe Harbor
organizations, 151 but has also noted the absence of complaints from
data subjects as one indication that those companies that are
registered are mainly in compliance. 152 Of greater concern to the
European Commission is the fact that few Safe Harbor companies
have incorporated the Safe Harbor Principles into their written
privacy policies to the Commission's satisfaction, and the Commission
seeks a more proactive compliance effort from the Department of

145.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
146.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 134.
147.
Shaffer, supra note 73, at 66.
148.
See Kobrin, supra note 58, at 128.
149.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor List, supra note 138.
150.
Compare Fortune 500 2006: Our Annual Ranking of America's Largest.
Corporations,
FORTUNE,
Apr.
17,
2006,
at
F1-F20,
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/full-list/, with U.S. Department of
Commerce, Safe Harbor List, supra note 138.
151.
The Commission is even considering analyzing the market share of Safe Harbor
companies as a way of measuring whether the program is likely having a significant
impact on data practices. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff
Working Document, The Implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the
Adequate Protectionof PersonalData Provided by the Safe HarbourPrivacy Principles and
Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of Commerce, 5, SEC
(2004) 1323 (Oct. 20, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/
docs/adequacy/sec-2004-1323_en.pdf [hereinafter Implementation of Commission Decision
520/2000/EC].

152.

Id. at 6.
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Commerce and the FTC. 153 How did the European Union and the
United States get to the current state of play regarding data privacy,
and to what extent have they addressed their privacy issues? More
importantly, where do they go from here in terms of their relationship
vis-et-vis privacy? Part III examines and assesses the interaction of
the United States and the European Union using concepts from game
theory and attempts to chart a course for a more satisfactory outcome.

III. SETTING THE MODEL
The utility of game theoretic models to analyze problems of law
and policy is well established.1 5 4 Scholars have used game theory
analysis to model competitive behavior with respect to valuable
intangible assets, such as intellectual property. 155 They have also long
used game theory to better understand and predict the actions of
states in the areas of international law and international trade. 156
The State vs. State context of the data privacy game presents a
competition among nations to capture or retain the value of intangible
information and may be modeled separately from either the IP or the
international trade games.
One potentially useful game theory model for examining the
State vs. State context is the normal form game, a 2x2
competition/cooperation matrix, the most familiar flavor of which is
the Prisoner's Dilemma. 57 In the normal form game, the players
move simultaneously, each choosing a strategy without knowledge of
the course of action chosen by the other player (although each player
may know a good deal of information about other aspects of their

153.
See id. at 7-8.
154.
See generally Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of
Competition, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 297-303 (1991) (citing game theory applications in
collective bargaining, antitrust, contracts, sales, property law, industrial organizations,
and agency theory, and relating legal applications of game theory to cross-purposes
optimization).
155.
See, e.g., David W. Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of
Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Corporation,60 U. CIN. L. REV. 305, 31618 (1991) (modeling foreign direct investment decisions, including technology transfer);
Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819, 852-72 (2003) (analyzing negotiation of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, or TRIPS Agreement).
156.
See, e.g., Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary InternationalLaw: A
Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143 (2001), Brett
Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of InternationalLaw, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679
(2003).
157.
See Shubik, supra note 154, at 288-90.
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The players face a binary choice of
playing environment). 158
strategies, promising different payoffs for each player depending upon
which of the two available strategies she chooses, and which of two
strategies is adopted by her co-player. 159 In a game of complete but
imperfect information, a common variant, the players know their own
available strategies and payoffs, as well as the available strategies
and payoffs of their co-player. 160 As noted above, however, a player
1 61
does not know which strategy her co-player will actually choose.
Payoffs are often represented, and will be represented here, as dollar
amounts gained or lost by the players.
A number of assumptions are necessary in creating the model
and situating the players therein. The United States faces a choice
between regulating uses and transfers of personal data or permitting
such uses and transfers to occur without interference (the choice will
be represented in the model as Regulate/Don't Regulate). Regulation
entails direct dollar costs in the form of creation and maintenance of
an administrative and/or judicial apparatus to enforce the regulatory
regime. The decision to regulate also reduces U.S. revenues from
commercial uses of personal data. A scheme that regulates data flows
may lead to certain transactions being halted that would otherwise be
completed. Such a scheme may also slow down transactions that
would otherwise be completed on a timelier basis. Fewer transactions
may be completed by U.S. firms, and those firms' revenues can be
Delays in completing those
expected to decrease over time.
the firms revenue. For the
also
cost
transactions that do succeed will
United States as a player in the game, the decrease in the revenue of
U.S. firms can be represented as an aggregate loss by all U.S. firms, or
as a loss of tax revenues for the United States as a state (such tax
revenue loss amounting to a percentage of the aggregate loss by the
firms).
The European Union faces a choice between permitting data
use and transfers by foreign firms on a fairly laissez faire basis, or
restricting such activity (represented in the model as Allow/Restrict).
Restriction entails a direct cost, just as regulation does for the United
States. However, we assume the European Union's marginal cost to
be lower than the United States' cost, due to a more developed preexisting infrastructure for the regulation of commercial transactions,

158.

159.
160.
161.

See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6-7 (1994).
See id. at 8.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
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including data transactions. 162 A decision by the European Union to
Restrict reduces United States revenues, potentially by a larger
amount than that caused by a United States decision to Regulate (due
to, for example, less concern on the part of E.U. regulators for revenue
effects of their activities on foreign firms than U.S. regulators would
likely demonstrate for their own domestic firms). If the European
Union decides to Allow, it faces a number of costs, some of which are
more quantifiable than others. There will, of course, be political costs
for a government that is seen as failing to protect what its
constituents hold to be a fundamental right. There may even be an
increase in direct litigation costs, as citizens either sue E.U. Member
States for failing to protect their rights or make increased use of
administrative and judicial apparatuses in enforcing rights against
private actors (whose data use and transfer activities are likely to
increase under an "Allow" regime).
Even more important from a strategic perspective is the
question of what costs in the way of lost revenues the European Union
might incur by deciding to Allow. If the European Union Restricts,
more transactions that would otherwise have been completed between
E.U. consumers and U.S. merchants will instead be completed
between E.U. consumers and E.U. firms. Therefore, by Allowing, the
European Union creates the possibility for the United States to
capture more of the value of the personal data of E.U. consumers.
This value is made up of the raw value of transactions with E.U.
consumers, plus whatever multiplier effect operates on future
transactions. 163 The value-capture issue forces the European Union,
when making the Allow/Restrict decision, to consider the global reach
of U.S. firms, the relatively aggressive marketing culture of U.S.
business, and the general orientation among U.S. firms toward
maximizing the use of, and return on, personal data as an investment
in the growth of the company.
In the model, for convenience, we assume that the value of the
personal data of E.U. consumers is 100. The United States faces a
cost to Regulate of 20. The European Union maintains a baseline cost
of regulation of 10, reflecting a more highly regulated economy in
general than that of the United States. If the European Union
chooses to Restrict, it incurs an additional cost of 10. If the United
162.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
163.
For example, maintaining a robust database of customer identifying data,
preferences, and purchase history may lead to more transactions in the future with
existing customers than if no such data is kept. Additionally, more new customers may be
marketed to, and transacted with in the future, if consumer data can be collected and
transferred to a central marketing department for analysis.
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States declines to Regulate, while the European Union chooses to
Allow, the United States captures 70% of the value of the personal
data, with the European Union capturing 30% (less its baseline
regulatory costs of 10, for a net payoff of 20). If the United States
declines to regulate while the European Union Restricts, the United
States captures 40% of the value, while the European Union receives
60% (less regulation costs of 10 and costs to Restrict of 10, resulting in
a net payoff of 40). If the United States Regulates while the European
Union Allows, each captures half the value of the data, less their
respective regulation costs (20 in the case of the United States, and 10
in the case of the European Union). If the United States Regulates
while the European Union Restricts, the United States earns 30% of
the value, less regulation costs of 20 (for a payoff of 10), while the
European Union captures 70% of the value, less baseline regulation
costs and costs to Restrict (for a net payoff of 70 minus 20, or 50). The
matrix and each party's payoffs appear as below 164:
Figure 1: Normal Form Game Between U.S. and E.U.

E.U.
Allow

Restrict

Regulate

(30, 40)

(10, 50)

Don't

(70, 20)

(40, 40)

U.S.
Regulate

164.

In each pair of payoffs, the U.S. payoff is listed first, and the E.U. payoff second.
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A strictly dominant strategy for the United States under this
model is non-Regulation. 165 Regardless of whether the European
Union decides to Allow or Restrict, the United States is better off
choosing not to Regulate (earning a payoff of 70 versus 30 in the event
of an Allow strategy by the European Union, and earning a payoff of
40 versus 10 in the event of a Restrict strategy by the European
Union). Given the dominance of the Don't Regulate strategy for the
United States, the European Union, acting rationally, will be forced to
pursue a Restrict strategy. As the European Union expects the
United States to choose Don't Regulate, it is better off choosing
Restrict (and earning 40), rather than Allow (earning 20).
Although the game as set forth above reaches equilibrium, it
does not necessarily produce an optimal or even desirable result. The
United States ends up capturing less value than it otherwise would,
and processing fewer transactions with E.U. consumers. This is
obviously a poor result for the United States, but it is also problematic
for those E.U. consumers who want to transact with U.S. firms. There
are transactions for which U.S. firms might be better suited, either
because E.U. firms do not provide the goods/services involved, or
because U.S. firms can provide the goods/services more cheaply or
efficiently. The inability of such transactions to be consummated
represents a loss to the system in the form of potential value left
uncaptured by anyone. Additionally, there may be some appetite
among U.S. consumers for some regulation of U.S. firms. 166 An
outcome that essentially means zero regulation by the United States
of its firms is an unfavorable one for U.S. consumers.
Beyond the suboptimality of the result, the model as defined so
far does not quite capture or predict the actual outcome of the game as
"played" in the real world. The United States and the European Union
forged a solution to their data privacy dilemma that provided not only
more than the zero regulation regime anticipated by the normal form
game, but also less than the predicted draconian restrictions on data
usage. 167 The predictive shortcoming of the normal form game here is
because it does not adequately capture the structure of the
relationship between the players. Unlike the motorist and pedestrian

165.

A strictly dominant strategy is one that is always the best choice for a

particular player, regardless of the strategy chosen by the other player. See BAIRD ET AL.,

supra note 158, at 11.
166.
The vigorous nature of the debate over privacy issues in the U.S., and the
advocacy activities of organizations such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email,
provide strong evidence of such a phenomenon.
167.
See discussion supra Part II.D regarding the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Program.
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often used to illustrate tort applications of the normal form game, 168
the United States and the European Union do not each make a single
decision regarding data protection with no idea of what move will be
the opponent will make. Instead, the players here make a series of
moves as part of an ongoing, recurring set of trade actions. Rather
than being simultaneous, as in the normal form game, the players'
interaction is dynamic and iterative. A party may make a move in one
round of play with an eye toward the effect of that move on future
rounds. Each party uses its opponent's early round moves to inform
strategy for later rounds. Thus, a more robust tool for analyzing the
U.S.-E.U. data competition is the extensive form game, which provides
the players an opportunity to assess and re-calculate strategy over the
course of repeated interactions.
The extensive form game models multiple rounds of actions
taken by the players, the sequence in which actions are taken, and the
information and options available to the players during each round.169
Despite its usefulness in iterative interactions, however, it is possible
to use the extensive form game to model an interaction between the
United States and the European Union that does little more than
replicate the results of the normal form game. For example, in the
Figure 2 below, with the United States moving first, backwards
induction indicates that the outcome will be Don't Regulate/Restrict.
Moving last, and faced with the indicated choices, the European Union
will choose Restrict over Allow in the event of a decision by the United
States to Regulate (earning 50 rather than 40, as in the normal form
model above), and it will also choose Restrict over Allow in the event
of a decision by the United States not to Regulate (earning 40 over 20,
as in the normal form model above). 170 In determining its first move,
the United States will take into account that the European Union's
only rational strategy in the second round is Restrict. Therefore, in
order to secure a payoff of 40 rather than 10, the United States will
choose Don't Regulate.

168.

See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS

43-46 (3d ed. 2003) (citing generally John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973)).

169.
See generally Shubik, supra note 154, at 286-88 (describing the game tree used
in extensive form game models).
170.
By convention, in each pair of payoffs, the payoff of the first mover (in this case
the U.S.) is listed first.
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Figure 2: Extensive Form Game with U.S. as First Mover

E.U. Restricts

E.U. Allows

0
U.S.
Regulates

U.S.

U.S.
Regulates

Does Not
Regulate

(10, 50)

(40, 40)

U.S. Does
Not
\Regulate

(30, 40)

(70,20)

Under the current set of payoffs, the outcome is no different if
the E.U. is the first mover (see Figure 3 below). Moving last, the U.S.
will choose Don't Regulate as its more lucrative strategy in the case of
both possible moves by the E.U.. Don't Regulate nets the U.S. a payoff
of 70 over 30 in the event of an Allow decision, and a payoff of 40 over
10 if the E.U. has chosen Restrict. Knowing the decision set faced by
the U.S. in the last move, the E.U. will choose Restrict in the first
move, in order to earn 40 rather than 20.171

171.
By convention, in each pair of payoffs, the payoff of the first mover (in this case
the E.U.) is listed first.
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Figure 3: Extensive Form Game with E.U. as First Mover

E.U. Restricts

U.S.
Regulates

E.U. Allows

U.S.
Regulates
U.S.
Does Not
Regulate

(50, 10)

(40, 40)

U.S. Does
Not
Regulate

(40, 30)

(20, 70)

To demonstrate more accurately the impact of iterative play in
the U.S.-E.U. data protection game, we must make adjustments to the
model. The revised model introduces an additional round of play, with
the European Union playing first. The European Union chooses
strategy, the United States follows, and then the European Union
receives a final play. 172 Along with the additional round, there are
adjustments to the parties' payoffs, due in part to an additional
strategy available to the European Union: Halt.
A number of additional assumptions are necessary in analyzing
the revised model with the Halt strategy available to the European
Union. First, adopting the Halt strategy imposes a significant cost on
the European Union. For purposes of the model, employing the Halt
strategy means ceasing all data transfers from the European Union to
the United States. It is obvious that such a move would heavily and
negatively impact U.S. payoffs, but the strategy is not without pain for
the European Union. The Halt strategy would necessitate more
rigorous (and expensive) enforcement in order to ensure that no

172.
It should be noted that, although we posit three rounds of play here, the model
may also be framed as having up to n rounds, with n being an odd number. The E.U.
makes the first and nth moves, and every odd-numbered move in between.
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personal information is transferred to the United States; such
enforcement costs can be expected to reduce the net amount of any
payoff to the European Union from the game.
Additionally,
collaborative opportunities between U.S. firms and E.U. firms would
be lost almost completely under the Halt strategy. Without the ability
to share data about customers by transferring data files to U.S. joint
venture partners, for example, E.U. firms will be less able to
strategically exploit the value of their information by forming
marketing alliances across the Atlantic. Finally, some of the data
controllers seeking to move data from the European Union to the
United States are E.U. firms, or at least E.U. divisions of U.S. firms.
Such firms or divisions may employ E.U. citizens locally and pay taxes
to E.U. Member States. Cessation of data flows would impact the
revenues of these local players, and reduce the wages and taxes that
they would typically pay in the European Union.
Given the costs of the Halt strategy to the European Union, it
will not employ the strategy lightly. If during any round the United
States chooses Regulate as its strategy, the European Union can be
expected not to pursue the Halt strategy during its turn. If the United
States chooses Don't Regulate, however, it can expect the European
Union to choose Halt in the next round, leading to a zero payoff for the
United States. We also assume that the cost to Restrict is cumulative;
if the European Union incurs such cost in multiple rounds, then the
total cost to Restrict will be a multiple of the base restriction cost of
10. For example, if the European Union initially Restricts, and then
Restricts again after the United States moves, its additional cost to
Restrict will be 20 rather than the 10 incurred when the Restrict
strategy is chosen (only once) in the normal form game. Therefore, the
payoff to the European Union will be reduced by 10, in the event that
the players pursue a Restrict-Regulate-Restrict chain of strategies.
Other payoffs are similarly affected by the iterative nature of
the game, and the particular sequence in which moves play out. If the
United States Regulates in response to a Restrict decision by the
European Union, the payoff to the United States is reduced by 10.
This result reflects increased costs caused by the adjustment on the
part of U.S. businesses to the practical limitations of the E.U.
restrictions coupled with the legal burdens of a new U.S. regulatory
scheme. If the European Union Allows initially, and then Allows
again following a play by the United States of Regulate, it gains
incremental revenue (its persistently permissive environment acting
cumulatively and providing space for more E.U.-involved transactions
to occur) and sees a +10 change in its payoff over the Allow-Regulate
pairing of the normal form game.
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The players' payoffs thus emerge as follows: If the parties
pursue Restrict-Regulate-Restrict, the European Union earns 40 and
the United States earns 10, while if they pursue Restrict-RegulateAllow, the European Union earns 40 and the United States earns 30.
A choice by the United States not to Regulate following a decision by
the European Union to Restrict leads to a 30-30 split in payoffs if the
European Union Restricts again, a payoff of 50 for the European
Union with a zero payoff for the United States if the European Union
Halts, and a payoff of E.U. = 20 and U.S. = 70 if the European Union
Allows on its second turn. If the players pursue Allow-RegulateRestrict, the European Union earns 50 and the United States earns
10, while if they pursue Allow-Regulate-Allow, the European Union
earns 50 and the United States earns 30. Meanwhile, a choice by the
United States not to Regulate following a European Union decision to
Allow leads to a payoff of E.U. = 40 and U.S. = 30 if the European
Union Restricts, a payoff of 50 for the European Union with a zero
payoff for the United States if the European Union Halts, and a payoff
of E.U. = 20 and U.S. = 70 if the European Union Allows again on its
second turn. These payoffs are illustrated in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Extended Form Game Including E.U. "Halt" Strategy
EU Restricts

us

us

us

US

Regulates

Does Not
Regulate

Regulates

Does Not
Regulate

EU
Restricts
EU
Restricts

EU Allows

EU
Allows

EU
Allows

EU
Restricts
EU
Restricts

EU

EU
Allows

EU
Allows
EU

Halts
A

FHalts

(40, 10) (40, 30) (30,30) (20, 70) (50, 10) (50, 0)

(50,30) (40, 30) (50, 0) (20, 70)

We can predict that the United States will not pursue any
strategy that would present the European Union with a
Restrict/Halt/Allow set of strategy choices. When presented with such
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a choice, the European Union will always choose Halt, opting to
receive a payoff of 50 rather than 30 (in the case of a Restrict-Don't
Regulate-Restrict progression of play), 20 (in the case of either
Restrict-Don't Regulate-Allow or Allow-Don't Regulate-Allow), or 40
(Allow-Don't Regulate-Restrict). The only way to avoid the European
Union's choosing the Halt strategy (and consigning the United States
to a payoff of 0) is for the United States not to choose Don't Regulate.
Because the United States will not elect a strategy that presents the
Halt option to the European Union, the branches of the tree that
include a Don't Regulate choice by the United States can effectively be
removed.
Only the Restrict-Regulate-Restrict, Restrict-RegulateAllow,
Allow-Regulate-Restrict,
and
Allow-Regulate-Allow
progressions are viable. Both progressions that begin with Allow
provide higher payoffs for the European Union than the progressions
that begin with Restrict (50 versus 40). Intuitively, this makes sense,
as the two Allow progressions provide more of an opportunity to avoid
cumulative enforcement costs associated with the Restrict strategy
over multiple rounds of play. As between the two remaining outcomes
that result from an Allow-first strategy, the European Union is
indifferent, as either will yield a payoff of 50.
If, after an Allow-Regulate set of moves by the players, the
European Union is indifferent between Allow and Restrict, how did
the players arrive at the current state of affairs, Safe Harbor (a
regime of mild regulation by the United States) and an Allow choice by
the European Union?
One explanation involves each player
communicating important information to the other in advance of, or
even simultaneously with, its actual moves in the game. First, the
European Union communicates to the United States a credible threat
to reduce its payoff from data transfers to zero. The framework
constructed by the E.U. Directive supports this threat by requiring
Member States to take steps to discontinue the flow of data to states
not deemed adequate protectors of personal information. 173 In any
round where such a strategy is available to the European Union, it
rationally adopts that strategy because of the opportunity for a
superior payoff. Knowing this fact, and respecting the threat, the
United States has an incentive to avoid the "Halt" choice presenting
itself in any given round of play. Thus, the United States is pushed
toward the adoption of some kind of Regulate strategy.
Once the United States chooses the Regulate strategy, there is
still the question of whether the European Union will choose Restrict
or Allow (each of which offers the same E.U. payoff). The United
173.

See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 62, art. 25.
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States has an incentive to attempt to induce an outcome that produces
a higher U.S. payoff (Allow, rather than Restrict). One way to do this
might be to communicate a commitment to protecting personal
information, such as by making an a prioripromise to Regulate, albeit
mildly. The European Union might cooperate with such a move by the
United States (by Allowing rather than Restricting on its second and
later turns) because the certainty of some regulation by the United
States is better than the uncertainty of the game without the U.S.
commitment. It is also possible that preserving other aspects of the
trade relationship between the players is worth choosing a strategy
that makes the rival better off, especially when it can be done without
making the mover worse off. By allowing the United States to
communicate some commitment to privacy and to implement some
mild form of regulation, Safe Harbor and the Allow-Regulate-Allow
progression that it represents, a Pareto superior outcome is presented
to the Allow-Regulate-Restrict progression that might otherwise
unfold. 174
So which player has "won," or is winning, this version of the
data privacy game? The short answer is the United States. Although
it has been persuaded to adopt a form of a Regulate strategy, such
regulation is relatively mild. The Safe Harbor regime does not reach
the level of comprehensiveness of the privacy protection systems in
European Union nations, and seems to preserve elements of the
historical American laissez-faire approach. For example, rather than
U.S. companies being subject to blanket rules, the Safe Harbor regime
allows a subset of those companies to "opt in" to a privacy-protective
mode of operation. Arguably, this would be a self-selecting group of
firms that consider privacy protection important, and large numbers
of firms that should be the object of regulation will escape scrutiny.
The companies set their own specific rules, via their privacy policies,
although they must align such rules with the Safe Harbor principles.
Further, members of Safe Harbor largely self-report their progress in
achieving privacy goals, 175 and they have the option to have privacy

174.
See e.g., POSNER, supra note 38, at 12-13 (explaining that a transaction or
allocation of resources is Pareto Superior to another if it makes at least one participant
better off without making any participant worse off, and that a Pareto optimal state of

affairs is one where any reallocation of resources would only increase the wealth of one
party at the expense of another).
175.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Final Safe Harbor Documents: Frequently
Asked Question 6, http://export.gov/safeharbor/FAQ6SelfCertFinal.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2006).
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disputes settled privately. 176 Other nations that have earned the
"adequate" designation from the European Union have had to create
much more pervasive and comprehensive systems in order to do so. 177
The European Union's own assessment of the game illustrates
the degree to which the United States has been able to implement a
"Regulate Lite" system. The Commission Staff Working Document on
the implementation of Safe Harbor (the "E.U. Safe Harbor Report"),
required by Decision 520/2000/EC, 178 reports that, although there has
been steady growth in the number of Safe Harbor companies, the
absolute number of companies signed up for the program is still small,
and the market share represented by such companies has not been
analyzed. 179 Therefore, the actual impact of the program on the
marketplace may be slight. Further, the privacy performance of
members of the program has yet to be audited by U.S. regulators, and
it is unclear at best whether any of the members' privacy policies
undergo regulatory scrutiny. 8 0
The E.U. Safe Harbor Report
expresses concern with the effectiveness of attempts by Safe Harbor
companies to translate the Safe Harbor principles into written (and
posted) privacy policies, and proposes a more proactive posture on the
part of the Department of Commerce and the FTC in policing these
issues.1 8 ' The issues raised by the E.U. Safe Harbor Report are
indicative of a regime that is still functioning in a largely selfregulatory manner, with mild government oversight, rather than the
all-encompassing regulation that could have been.
The game's outcome is not a pure victory for the United States
however, nor is it a pure loss for the European Union. Although the
Commission notes that there have been no comprehensive audits of
compliance with Safe Harbor principles, it also notes that it has
176.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Final Safe Harbor Documents: Frequently
Asked Question 11 http://export.gov/safeharbor/FAQ11FINAL.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2006).
177.
For example, Canada's Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act ("PIPEDA") is broad-based, applying with certain exceptions to "every
organization in respect of personal information (a) that the organization collects, uses or
discloses in the course of commercial activities; or (b) is about an employee of the
organization ..
" Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000
S.C., ch. 5 (Can.). PIPEDA imposes specific affirmative obligations on collection, use,
disclosure, access, notice, and the like. Id.
178.
Decision 520/2000/EC requires the Commission to assess Safe Harbor three
years after its announcement and evaluate whether the system is providing adequate
protection. See Implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC,supra note 151, at
3.
179.
Id. at 5.
180.
Id. at 6.
181.
See id. at 7-8.
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received no complaints from data subjects.18 2 The number of Safe
Harbor complaints referred to alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")
organizations such as TRUSTe, the Direct Marketing Association,
BBBOnline, and the American Arbitration Association, has been
"insignificant," such that the Commission does not have enough of a
sample to evaluate fully the privacy decisions of the program's ADR

providers. 183
It may be that, from the perspective of the European data
subject, U.S. data usage under Safe Harbor has not been
objectionable, or at least not sufficiently objectionable for the harm
done to outweigh the transaction costs of invoking the complaint
system. And despite the issues raised in the E.U. Safe Harbor Report,
the Commission finds that the U.S. Department of Commerce is
generally "carrying out its role in accordance with the Safe Harbour
requirements."'1 4 Additionally, there is much anecdotal evidence that
U.S. firms are becoming more thoughtful about their data protection
posture and policies. A proliferation of written (and posted) privacy
policies, the installation of executive level hires with titles like Chief
Privacy Officer, and the institution by some companies of data privacy
audits are a few examples of this trend. 185 Even though the result
here can be counted as a U.S. win, it certainly presents an outcome
much more favorable to the European Union than that which would
result from total U.S. non-cooperation.
The U.S.-E.U. outcome contains elements of two types of game
settings recognized in the game theory literature. The data privacy
competition is related to both cooperation games, where the players
mutually benefit from cooperating, but only repeated play discourages
defection, and coordination games, where "each state's best move
depends on the move of the other state."18 6 The keys to bringing about
a semblance of a "win-win" outcome, as in many iterative interactions,
are mutual concern for the future, an expectation that the players will
encounter each other again, and the capacity for a player to punish
the other in some future period.18 7 When these keys are present,
iteration can lead to more cooperative behavior than defecting

182.
Id. at 6.
183.
Id. at 11.
184.
Id. at 13.
185.
See, e.g., Claudia Rowe, In Business; Keeping it Confidential, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
3, 2002, § 14WC, at 3; John Schwartz, The Nation: Surveillance 101; Privacy vs. Security on
Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, § 4, at 3.
186.
Chinen, supra note 156, at 148-49 (quoting Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999)).
187.
See id. at 167.
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behavior, and to more jointly beneficial outcomes. 8 8
The trade
relationship between the United States and the European Union
(especially as regards personal information) fits the classic criteria for
this sort of result. The volume and connectedness of their mutual
trade make the two parties extremely important partners to each
other, and their interactions can be expected to continue into future
periods without end. Further, the capacity for punishment carries
particular potency in the data arena, given the pervasiveness and
importance of data as both a commodity itself, and as a vital
89
component of trade in all other commodities.
Game theory also predicts the structural and institutional
underpinnings of the U.S.-E.U. data privacy result. Where several
possible equilibriums exist, focal points can be essential to bringing
about a particular, jointly beneficial one. A focal point is "anything
that tends to focus the players' attention on one particular
equilibrium, in a way that is commonly recognized, tends to make this
the equilibrium that the players will expect and thus actually
implement."' 190 Communication is a means for creating focal points;
therefore treaties, or similar agreements, can serve as focal points in
interactions between states. Cooperative moves that would lead to
high joint payoffs can be recorded in an agreement to inform parties as
they consider their moves during the life of the agreement and to set a
minimum behavioral benchmark. 191 In the case of the U.S.-E.U. data
privacy competition, the E.U. Directive, as an agreement among the
E.U. Member States, and the Safe Harbor program (including the
reporting mechanism of the Working Party), as an agreement between
the European Union and the United States, serve the focal point
function by focusing the players on strategy choices, and therefore
equilibriums, that involve some level of regulation by the United
States in order to avoid possible outcomes that might invoke a
cessation of data flows from the European Union to the United States.
Establishment of institutions can also engender cooperative
strategies such as those employed by the players in the current game.
Jointly created institutions, such as Safe Harbor, can be used as a
method for implementing cooperative strategies. Their joint nature
increases the likelihood that the players will not only cooperate
188.
See Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the
Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 416, 419 (1999) (citing ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984)).

189.
190.

See discussion supra at Part I.A.
Chinen, supra note 156, at 153 (quoting ROGER B. MEYERSON, GAME THEORY:

ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 371 (1991)).

191.

See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 186, at 1171.
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initially, but will cooperate in a continued manner over time. 192 Like
agreements, institutions can also serve to minimize uncertainty and
193
transaction costs associated with dynamic playing environments.
Where the underlying assumptions and setting are subject to
evolution, institutions can be used to adjust payoffs and commitments
in an orderly and mutually beneficial manner, with minimal harm to
the relationship between the players. 194 Given the dynamic nature of
the U.S.-E.U. data collection and usage environment, and the vital
nature of the trade, creation of institutions such as Safe Harbor is
entirely predictable based on a careful application of game theory
concepts in this space.
IV. CONCLUSION

What is the future of the U.S.-E.U. data privacy game? Have
the players reached an equilibrium that is stable in addition to being
mutually beneficial?
What changes can be expected in the
relationship between the players, and in their views regarding the
strategies available to them in the ongoing competition? How will the
parties seek either to seize further advantage, or to protect gains
under the current equilibrium? Of course, none of the answers to the
above questions can be predicted with certainty, but the play of the
game thus far and the levers used by the parties to arrive at the
current state of the world provide some guidance. The parties have
used communication and institutions to create focal points and reduce
uncertainty. Communication of a credible threat to halt data flows,
and the existence of a supranational institution to facilitate carrying
out the threat, led to the adoption of a mild form of regulation by the
United States, rather than no regulation at all. The Safe Harbor
program itself represents an institution that sets baseline
expectations for acceptable strategy choices in the ongoing game, and
also provides communication opportunities.
The European Union continues to signal, via the E.U. Safe
Harbor Report, that certain U.S. strategy choices (more proactive
oversight, audits of Safe Harbor companies by regulators, analysis of
Website privacy policies) are more conducive to continuation of the
mutually favorable current equilibrium than others. The European
Union also continues to signal that "the E.U. panel and data
protection authorities should invite organizations that subscribe to the

192.
193.
194.

Frischmann, supra note 156, at 719.
Id. at 683.
Id.
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Principles to effectively comply with the Principles and use their
power to suspend data flows if they conclude that there is a
substantial likelihood that the Principles are being violated."'195
Cessation of data flows is still an option, and both players understand
that. The institutional anchors and communication devices that have
been put in place in this game can be expected to preserve the core
gains (to the European Union as a player, to the United States as a
player, and to their respective data subjects) of the current
equilibrium, while slowly introducing more substance to the "Regulate
Lite" strategy. The individual European citizen will not be completely
let alone, but her data privacy rights with respect to United States
actors will certainly exceed zero.

195.

Implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC,supra note 151, at 8.

